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Research on emotion regulation has focused upon observers’
ability to regulate their emotional reaction to stimuli such as
affective pictures, but many other aspects of our affective expe-
rience are also potentially amenable to intentional cognitive reg-
ulation. In the domain of decision-making, recent work has dem-
onstrated a role for emotions in choice, although such work has
generally remained agnostic about the specific role of emotion.
Combining psychologically-derived cognitive strategies, physio-
logical measurements of arousal, and an economic model of
behavior, this study examined changes in choices (specifically, loss
aversion) and physiological correlates of behavior as the result of
an intentional cognitive regulation strategy. Participants were on
average more aroused per dollar to losses relative to gains, as
measured with skin conductance response, and the difference
in arousal to losses versus gains correlated with behavioral loss
aversion across subjects. These results suggest a specific role
for arousal responses in loss aversion. Most importantly, the
intentional cognitive regulation strategy, which emphasized
‘‘perspective-taking,’’ uniquely reduced both behavioral loss aver-
sion and arousal to losses relative to gains, largely by influencing
arousal to losses. Our results confirm previous research demon-
strating loss aversion while providing new evidence characterizing
individual differences and arousal correlates and illustrating the
effectiveness of intentional regulation strategies in reducing loss
aversion both behaviorally and physiologically.
arousal  emotion regulation  decision-making
We are not at the whim of our emotions—rather, researchon emotion regulation suggests we have a degree of
control over our affective state and can reduce or enhance the
emotional impact of a given stimulus in real time (1).We are able
to do this intentionally, and when doing so, we not only report
decreased negative affect (1–3) but also show signs of decreased
physiological responding (4, 5) and decreased activity in brain
areas that are closely linked to emotions and affect (1–3).
Emotion regulation research so far has primarily used pictures
(1–5), but any stimulus that results in an emotional response
could theoretically be the target of regulation. We propose to
examine a specific role for emotions in economic choice behavior
and to observe the effects of an intentional cognitive regulation
strategy on both behavior and associated emotional responses.
It is widely acknowledged that emotion plays a role in decision-
making, drawing on evidence from numerous behavioral studies
using emotional stimuli as well as physiological, neuroimaging,
and lesion studies. For example, one study demonstrated that
irrelevant emotional states induced by film clips could eliminate
or even reverse the endowment effect (higher selling than buying
prices) in subsequent choices (6). Another study on consumption
behavior of drinks showed that the subliminal presentation of
emotional faces not only altered participants’ ratings of various
drinks but also the actual amount they drank and the price they
were willing to pay for the drink (7). These startling results
clearly demonstrate an effect of emotional stimuli on decisions,
even when these stimuli are irrelevant or below awareness.
Self-reports of affect have been used to explore the effect of
subjective feelings on choices (8, 9), widening the possible
measures of the affective experience. Neuroimaging studies
(10–13) and studies with brain-damaged patients (11, 14–16)
have repeatedly demonstrated the involvement and necessity of
brain regions including the amygdala and insula in decision-
making, although these particular areas are arguably best known
for their association with a range of tasks involving emotion and
physiological responding (17–20). This overlap suggests there are
some common underlying mechanisms involved in reward,
choice, and emotion. For example, a now-classic study using the
Iowa Gambling Task illustrated the close relationship between
physiological arousal and choices in normal participants but
showed that brain-damaged patients, who did not show normal
arousal responses, also did not show normal choice patterns (14).
A similar study with the same patients (and others) showed
behavior consistent with diminished sensitivity to losses (16),
further establishing the necessity of emotion-related brain re-
gions in mediating aspects of decision-making. The current study
builds on this research by using behavioral models and physio-
logical measures to investigate a specific and quantifiable role for
emotional responses in risky monetary decision-making.
Given the aforementioned work suggesting emotions may play
a central role in the anticipation and processing of losses, the
phenomenon of loss aversion is of obvious interest. In 1979,
Kahneman and Tversky (21) suggested that losses loom larger
than equivalent gains, a property called ‘‘loss aversion.’’ Loss
aversion subsequently came to be conceptualized as a multipli-
cative overweighting of losses relative to gains represented by a
parameter  (21). Laboratory studies have since demonstrated
that humans can show loss aversion for objects such as mugs (22),
money (23), and simulated investments (24, 25). This work has
been supported by analyses of real world data that show similar
behavior in, among other situations, stock markets (26–28), the
pricing and purchasing of consumables (29, 30) and condomin-
iums (31), and the choice of work hours by cabdrivers (32). It has
been suggested that loss aversion might have a specific, evolu-
tionarily conserved neurobiological basis (as opposed to being
epiphenomenal or cultural in origin). Supporting this claim, work
with primates has shown that our genetic cousins also exhibit loss
aversion in a fiat currency economy (33). Loss aversion appears
to exist across both domains and species, and because decision-
making in the context of possible losses has been linked to
emotional responses, loss aversion is an excellent candidate
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measure for examining the effect of intentional regulation
strategies on emotion-related aspects of choice behavior.
In determining a strategy that might affect loss aversion, we
return to research on intentional emotion regulation with a focus
on reinterpretation (often termed ‘‘reappraisal’’) (1, 2, 34). As
opposed to other kinds of emotion regulation techniques, rein-
terpretation is distinguished by changing the meaning of a
stimulus with the goal of altering the resulting affective state.
The stimulus remains physically identical, but the perceiver
thinks about it in a different way, perhaps focusing on different
aspects of it, taking a different perspective, or putting it in some
greater context that changes its immediate meaning. Such rein-
terpretation of a disturbing image of injured people could
include imagining that the people in the image are just actors
withmakeup performing a stunt, or recognizing that even a small
cut can sometimes bleed quite a bit, making things look much
worse than they actually are. In the context of monetary deci-
sions, reinterpretation of a particular outcome could include
putting it in a greater context as one of many outcomes (35) or
taking a different perspective on a choice, perhaps imagining
that oneself is an experienced professional trader, rather than an
excitable amateur investor. These kinds of strategies are some-
times recommended to investors in articles (36) or investment
guides. For example, one investment company reminded their
clients that ‘‘it is the return of the entire portfolio that matters,
not the individual parts. Stay focused on how your investments
are performing as a whole, rather than each one, to get over the
inevitable bumps in the road toward reaching your goals.’’ These
reinterpretations are not in the spirit of denial (‘‘it does not exist,
look away, think of something else’’) but rather focus on the
affect-inducing object and attempt to change its meaning for the
participant.
In the current study, we examine loss averse behavior, its
physiological correlates, and the impact of an intentional regu-
lation strategy on these variables. Emotion is a complex con-
struct, and one commonly accepted theoretical approach is to
consider emotion as consisting of multiple component processes
(37), including facial and vocal expression, subjective feelings,
action tendencies, bodily responses, and cognitive appraisals. For
the following study, we focus on the latter 3 components.
Participants’ choices are our objective measure of action ten-
dencies, modeled on an individual participant basis with quan-
titative parametric behavioral models conventionally used in
economics. We measure participants’ skin conductance to quan-
tify bodily arousal responses, and relate such responses to
behavior. Finally, cognitive appraisal is operationalized as the
intentional cognitive regulation strategy that we instruct partic-
ipants to use. This strategy is similar to other emotion regulation
strategies in its reinterpretive nature, despite its content being
more relevant to economic decisions. We observe both behav-
ioral and physiological consequences of the strategy, suggesting
that emotional responses are related to the observed behavior.
By combining the above variables and individual level behavioral
and physiological analyses, we can explore subtle effects within
subjects, and can speak directly to the effects of our strategy on
a given individual, rather than being limited to group analysis.
Participants made a series of forcedmonetary choices between
a binary gamble (P 0.5) and a guaranteed amount (P 1) (Fig.
S1). All choice outcomes were realized immediately after deci-
sion (e.g., ‘‘you won’’). One hundred and forty choices consti-
tuted a ‘‘set,’’ fromwhich we quantified 3 aspects of behavior: the
weighting of losses relative to gains (loss aversion, ), attitudes
toward chance (risk aversion, ), and consistency over choices
(logit sensitivity, ) (Fig. S2). The values in the set were selected
a priori to allow accurate estimation of a range of possible values
of , , and . The participants completed 2 full sets of choices:
one while using the ‘‘Attend’’ strategy, which emphasized each
choice in isolation from any context, ‘‘as if it was the only one,’’
and the other using the “Regulate” strategy, emphasizing choices
in their greater context, ‘‘as if creating a portfolio’’ (complete
instructions included in the SI Text). This allowed separate
quantification of Attend and Regulate behavior for each subject.
Choices were presented in pseudorandomly ordered blocks of 10
with a given strategy, and block order, gamble order, and gamble
outcome were counterbalanced across participants. The concep-
tual nature of the strategies was emphasized and participants
were thoroughly instructed and quizzed on all procedures. In
Study 1, the participants were initially endowed with $30 and
were paid this sum plus actual gains or losses from 10% of the
trials selected at random upon completion of the study. Study 2
had an identical behavioral session as Study 1, but the partici-
pants returned for a separate session in which their skin con-
ductance response (SCR, a measure of sympathetic nervous
system activity) was recorded during the choice task as ameasure
of arousal. See Methods and SI Text for more detail.
Results
Study 1 Results.
Attend Results.Mean parameter estimates (with standard errors)
were   1.40 (0.15),   0.83 (0.04), and   2.57 (0.29).
Because of the multiplicative nature of the loss aversion param-
eter , taking the log can avoid biases in calculating the mean.
The mean log() value was 0.198 (0.09) and was significantly
greater than zero (t(29)  2.113, P  0.05), indicating that the
group was on average loss averse. Translating that value out of
the log scale by raising the constant e to that value gave a mean
 of 1.22.
The range of parameter values were : 0.41–3.91, : 0.37–1.23,
and : 0.71–6.53. Individual  values are found in Fig. 1. These
values indicate that there are 9 gain seeking, 7 gain-loss neutral,
and 14 loss averse participants in our sample, where gain seeking
is defined as having a  significantly less than 1, gain-loss neutral
is defined as having a  not significantly different from 1, and loss
averse is defined as having a  significantly greater than 1.
Regulate Results. Mean parameter estimates (with standard er-
rors) were   1.17 (0.15),   0.87 (.04), and   2.39 (0.29).
The mean log() value was 0.0005 (0.10), and was not signif-
icantly different from zero (t(29)  0.005, not significant
(n.s.)). This corresponded to amean  0.999. Paired t tests with
the Attend data were conducted to determine the effect of the
cognitive strategy within-subjects on the parameters estimated.
An effect was observed for the loss aversion coefficient 
(t(29)  3.64 P  0.0011), but not for  (t(29)  1.66 P  0.11)
or  (t(29)  0.79 P  0.44).
Although 26 out of 30 subjects showed decreases in loss
aversion when using the Regulate strategy, there was variability
across individuals in the strength of the effect. To capture some
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Fig. 1. Individual loss aversion coefficients () when using the Attend
strategy in Study 1. Green indicates  1 (gain seeking), blue indicates  is not
different from 1 (gain-loss neutral), and red indicates  1 (loss averse). Error
bars are standard error of the mean.
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of this variability and quantify the strength of this effect, we
performed likelihood ratio tests on the parameters (seeMethods
and SI Text) to identify individuals with differences in param-
eters between the conditions stronger than a cutoff P value of
0.05. Of 30 subjects, 15 exceeded the criterion for changes in ,
3 for changes in estimated  values, and 2 for changes in their
estimated  values. Overall, individuals’ loss aversion as mea-
sured during the attend instruction (Attend) was reduced by an
average of 16% (standard error 3.09%) during the regulate
instruction (Regulate) (See Fig. 2). This effect was independent
of Attend (r  0.03, n.s.).
Counterbalancing (including block order, gamble outcome,
and gamble order within block) had no effects on parameter
estimates or the effectiveness of the Regulate strategy. See SI
Text for more details.
Study 2 Results.
Behavioral Results. The behavioral results in Study 2 confirmed
those of Study 1. Mean Attend parameter estimates (with
standard errors) were   1.31 (0.13),   0.88 (0.03), and  
2.97 (0.28). Mean Regulate parameter estimates (with standard
errors) were  1.15 (0.12),  0.92 (0.03), and  2.60 (0.23).
Paired t tests between the Attend and Regulate conditions
confirmed a strong effect for the loss aversion coefficient 
(t(28)  6.91 P  1.6  107). There was no significant effect
on  (t(28)  1.82 P  0.08), or  (t(28)  1.40 P  0.17).
Physiological Results. Because amounts of money won or lost
varied both within participants and between participants, SCR at
outcome in units of microsiemens (S; square-root transformed
to reduce skewness) were normalized by the amount of money
won or lost on a given trial, giving each participant an average
Gain SCR score and average Loss SCR score with units of
S/$. In addition to the Gain and Loss SCR scores, we created
an SCR difference score of Loss  Gain as a physiological
measure of loss aversion.
On average, losses were more arousing than gains in the
Attend condition (Loss  Gain  0.0092 S/$, t(28)  1.89,
P  0.035 one-sample t test, one-tailed), but not in the Regulate
condition (Loss Gain 0.0017S/$, t(28) 0.24, P 0.40
one-sample t test, one-tailed). However, although 28 of the 29
subjects in Study 2 showed a decrease in loss aversion with the
regulation strategy, there was extensive variability in the strength
of the effect. To characterize that variability, we separated
participants using likelihood ratio tests. We divided them based
on whether they exceeded the cutoff for changes in their 
coefficient between Attend and Regulate, creating 2 groups:
Regulators (P  0.05), and Nonregulators (P  0.05). Only
Regulators showed a significant decrease in the Loss  Gain
SCR difference score fromAttend to Regulate (Attend 0.0102
S/$, Regulate  0.0102 S/$, t(13)  2.04, P  0.031
one-tailed paired t test), whereas Nonregulators showed a non-
significant increase (Attend 0.0089S/$, Regulate 0.0128
S/$, t(14)  0.49, P  0.64 two-tailed paired t test) (see
Fig. 3).
We also conducted ANOVAs on the Gain and Loss SCR
scores. A 2  2  2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors of
Outcome (Loss, Gain), Strategy (Attend, Regulate), and Group
(Regulators, Nonregulators), revealed a trending interaction
between all 3 factors (F (1, 27)  3.70 P  0.065), but no other
interactions nor main effects (all P’s  0.29). To examine what
might be driving the 3-way interaction, we conducted separate
2  2 repeated measures ANOVAs on the Gain and Loss SCR
scores. The Loss SCR score ANOVA showed a trending inter-
action between Strategy and Group (F(1,27)  3.791 P  0.062,
all other P’s  0.37), but an identical ANOVA on just the Gain
SCR score had no significant main effects or interactions (all
P’s  0.48), illustrating that the initial 3-way interaction was
driven in large part by changes in the Loss SCR score.
Individuals’ LossGain SCR difference scores also positively
correlated with their respective behavioral loss aversion ()
coefficients in both the Attend condition (r(27)  0.394, P 
0.035) (See Fig. 4), and the Regulate condition (r(27)  0.403,
P  0.031).
Model Estimation. To test the significance of the estimated pa-
rameters, we performed a likelihood ratio test for each individ-
ual in each condition, contrasting the likelihood of the data given
the estimated parameters for that condition with the likelihood
of the data given a random choice model. This showed that for
subjects of Study 1 in both conditions (60 sets of parameters
total), all estimated models had a P  5  105, and 56 out of
60 models had a P  1  1010 (Participants’ models in Study
2 had similar significance levels). For more details on validity
tests of the model, see Methods.
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Fig. 2. Percent change in loss aversion due to the cognitive strategy in Study
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indicates less loss aversion during Regulate trials. Participants are in the same
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Fig. 3. Average Loss Gain (S/$) SCR difference scores from Study 2. (A)
Across all subjects, arousal is greater per dollar to losses than gains, but only
in the Attend condition. (B) Regulators (exceeded cutoff for decrease in )
show a significant decrease in the difference score, while Nonregulators (did
not exceed cutoff for decrease in ) donot. Error bars are standard error of the
mean.
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Discussion
Our results support the idea that taking a perspective similar to
that of a trader can alter choices and arousal responses related
to loss aversion. Building upon the evidence that emotions have
a role in decision-making (6–9, 12), and that there might be an
important role in decision-making for the anticipation of emo-
tional responses to losses (16), we show that loss aversion is
linked to physiological arousal responses to loss outcomes rel-
ative to gain outcomes and that these measures are reliably and
systematically affected by perspective-taking.
In Study 1, we showed that an intentional reinterpretive
regulation strategy had a specific and strong effect in decreasing
individuals’ initial levels of loss aversion. No other measure-
ments of behavior showed significant changes as a result of using
the strategy. Study 2 demonstrated that behavioral loss aversion
was correlated with a physiological arousal measure, specifically
the SCR per dollar to loss outcomes relative to gain outcomes.
Furthermore, Study 2 showed that only the individuals most
successful at reducing their degree of loss aversion by taking a
different perspective had a corresponding reduction in the
physiological arousal response to loss outcomes.
One goal of this study was to find an ecologically plausible
reinterpretive strategy that could lead to a change in the
emotional significance of some of the components of decision-
making. In this context, it appears that ‘‘thinking like a trader’’
may reduce the subjective impact of loss outcomes. Just as recent
work demonstrating that individuals’ anticipation of loss may
shift their choices (38), it appears that participants in our study
similarly anticipated their responses to gains and losses and
chose accordingly (39). Given the correlational nature of this
study, however, future manipulations that alter arousal directly
will be necessary to demonstrate causality.
This is not the first study to show the effect of perspective-
taking on loss-averse behavior. For example, a study by Thaler
et al. (25) applied an ecologically plausible situational manipu-
lation (based on the frequency of feedback for risky investments)
in a between-subjects design. They showed that temporally
bracketing choices decreased the occurrence of behavior con-
sistent with loss aversion [similar to results found by Gneezy and
Potters (24)]. Other studies have hypothesized that emotional
attachment and cognitive perspective might modulate loss aver-
sion and, more specifically, that having the intention to trade
some good or currency would reduce loss aversion for that item,
potentially through affective and/or cognitive means (40–42).
This study builds upon these ideas, combining intentional reg-
ulation, cognitive perspective taking, and physiological measure-
ments of arousal. We have shown that not only do different
individuals’ perspectives alter their choices but also that within
an individual, choosing to take a different perspective can
reliably reduce their loss aversion.
In addition, our demonstration of changes in arousal due to
the intentional regulation strategy coincides with evidence from
studies of the cognitive regulation of emotion illustrating sig-
nificant behavioral (1–3), physiological (4, 5), and neural (1–3)
changes associated with the intentional use of regulation strat-
egies to reappraise emotional stimuli. Because the ‘‘trader
perspective,’’ or portfolio approach, that our regulation strategy
encourages is similarly reinterpretive, it is possible that a related
mechanism is at work. In that context, this study may provide
some insight into what separates professional traders and gam-
blers from amateurs. It is possible that professionals and ama-
teurs are fundamentally different people from the start, but it is
also possible that professionals have learned not just facts about
investments, but strategies for addressing the normal emotional
responses that might prevent amateurs from making the same
decisions, given the same information (36, 43, 44). Indeed,
professional sports card dealers (45), condominium investors
(rather than owners) (31), and experienced cab drivers (32) show
less apparent response to loss than less experienced agents.
Our results also shed light on a simmering debate about the
nature of loss aversion (42, 46): do losses hurt as much as our
decisions to avoid them suggest, or are we overzealous at the time
of decision in predicting that losses will hurt disproportionately,
when in fact they are not any worse than gains are good? In other
words, is loss aversion due to a basic hedonic property of our
reaction to losses, as are simple basic preferences for food, sleep,
sex, and warmth? Or is it a kind of error in judgment caused by
an exaggerated fear of losses relative to their actual impact (47),
perhaps due to an underappreciation of our capacity for emo-
tional adaptation to negative events (48)? Our results support
the former, ‘‘hedonic,’’ interpretation, that losses do hurt more
than gains feel good, because differential physiological arousal
responses are linked to actual feedback about loss and gain, and
therefore, at least to some degree, loss aversion may not be a
judgment error. However, our results also support the latter,
‘‘judgmental error,’’ interpretation to some extent by demon-
strating that cognitive strategies can systematically reduce loss
aversion behaviorally and physiologically; so whatever ‘‘fear of
loss’’ may exist is not so basic as to be immutable, but is instead
subject to regulation. At least it appears there is some hope for
the ‘‘amateur’’ decision-maker, in that a simple reinterpretation
might mitigate one dimension of the difference between ama-
teurs and professionals. We can change how we decide, and
although we may be sensitive to losses, we can make ourselves
less so.
Methods
Subjects. In Study 1, 30 participants (13 male, mean age 22  3 years) com-
pleted the experiment. In Study 2, 52 participants (19 male, mean age 21 3
years) completed the behavioral session. Twelve were excluded based on
highly imprecise parameter estimation*, 4 for noiseless performance†, 2 for
outlier behavior (3 SD from the mean), and 2 for instruction-related issues.
Of the remaining 32 participants, one was excluded for SCR nonresponding
and one could not make a second session. The remaining 30 participants
completed the physiological session, in which one participant was dropped
for experimenter error. The behavioral and physiological data from the
*The measure used at the time to define significance in the model was later replaced with
the likelihood ratio test (see the SI Text).
†For participants whose decisions can be fit perfectly (with no noise parameter), there is a
range of parameter valueswhich fit equallywell, and no standard procedure for choosing
one of these sets of values over the others. Problems with noiseless data are common in
such estimations.
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remaining 29 participants is presented. The experiment was approved by
the University Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects at New
York University.
Procedure—Study 1 and Study 2 Behavioral Session. Participants were en-
dowedwith$30 immediately followingcompletionof informedconsent. They
were told the money was theirs to risk during the study and were asked to
place it in their wallets or purses. At the end of the study, the endowmentwas
adjusted by the actual value of the outcome of 28 randomly selected trials
(10% of all trials), given their choices. Participants could lose a maximum of
$30 (returning the entire endowment) and win a theoretical maximum of
$572. All participants also received a $15 subject fee upon completion of the
study.
Participants were thoroughly instructed and quizzed on task details and
strategy use. See SI Text for more details.
Therewere2 cognitive regulation strategies (for the completewording, see
SI Text). For theAttend strategy, participantswere instructed to consider each
monetary choice in isolation from all other choices, to make each of those
decisions as if it was the only choice theyweremaking for the study, and to let
any emotions or thoughts occur naturally, without trying to control them.We
conceived of this instruction to mirror the everyday approach to decisions for
most people—that is, one at a time, individually. For the Regulate strategy,
participants were instructed to consider each monetary choice in the context
of the other choices in that category, as if they were creating a portfolio. The
instruction included phrases like “imagine yourself [as] a trader,” “you do this
all the time,” and “treat it as one of manymonetary decisions, which will sum
together to produce a ‘portfolio.’” This strategy was intended to be what a
professional tradermightdowhenmakingmanyportfolio-styledecisions. The
conceptual nature of the strategy was emphasized by asking participants to
not keep a running total of their previous outcomes. We were not concerned
with isolating the efficacious parts of our instructions, but with observing
effects given an ecologically relevant general approach of considering choices
in their context. Future research could unpack the effects of these various
strategic components.
The presented choices were identical for both instructed strategies, except
for the random outcomes of the risky gambles. Each set of 140 choices
consisted of 120 choices between mixed-valence gambles (positive and neg-
ative possible outcomes) and guaranteed amounts of zero, and 20 choices
betweengainonlygambles (positive andzeropossibleoutcomes) andpositive
guaranteed amounts. Each decision was resolved immediately after choice
with the outcome of the gamble or the guaranteed amount, depending on
participants’ choices (see SI Text for the exactmonetary amounts). Participants
completed choices in blocks of 10, using one cognitive strategy during each
block. The blocks were pseudorandomly ordered such that no strategy ever
occurred more than 3 times in a row. Participants completed one of 4 task
orders, which were independently randomized along the following dimen-
sions: order of condition blocks (Attend, Regulate), gamble outcomes (‘‘win,’’
‘‘lose’’), and gamble order within each condition.
Before each block of 10 trials, the regulation instruction was displayed for
5 s. Each trial consisted of the presentation of a monetary choice (4 s), a
response period (2 s), and the choice outcome (1 s), with a 1 s inter-stimulus
interval between response and outcome and a 1–3 s variable inter-trial
interval.
Procedure—Study 2 Physiological Session. Participants returned within 2
weeks after the behavioral session for a physiological assessment. The assess-
ment consisted of 2 sessions at least 48 h apart. The endowment and instruc-
tions were exactly the same as in the behavioral session, including a $30
endowment, detailed task instructions, a task quiz, and strategy instruction.
Over both sessions, participants completed a total of 120 choices between
mixed-valence gambles and a guaranteed amount of zero. Sixty choices were
completed using the Attend strategy, and 60 with the Regulate strategy.
Choice values were selected a priori using participants’ parameter estimates
from the behavioral session to equalize the number of win, loss, and guaran-
teed outcomes. See the SI Text for more details. The choice structure had the
following changes: each monetary decision consisted of an instruction (1 s)
indicating which strategy to use, the presentation of a monetary choice (2 s),
a response period (2 s), and the choice outcome (1 s). Because of the lagged
nature of the skin conductance response, variable periods of fixation (8–11s)
were inserted before and after outcomes to allow isolation of the responses
to each outcome. Trial order and win/lose outcomes were randomly ordered
for each subject.
SCR. SCR was measured using Ag-AgCl electrodes attached to the crease
between the distal and middle phalanges of the first and second digits of the
left hand. The SCR data were amplified and recorded with a BIOPAC Systems
skin conductance module connected to an Apple computer. Data were re-
corded at a rate of 200 samples per second. SCR analysis was conducted using
AcqKnowledge software (BIOPAC Systems Inc.).
SCR (in S) was measured as the trough-to-peak amplitude difference in
skin conductance of the largest response in the window 0.5 s after stimulus
onset to 4.5 s after stimulus offset. Aminimal response criterionwas set at 0.02
S, and responses not exceeding this threshold were scored as ‘‘0.’’ SCR data
were low-pass filtered (25Hz), smoothed (3 sample kernel), and square-root
transformed to reduce skewness. SCRs at outcome were normalized with the
dollar amount of the outcome to producemeasurementswith units ofS/$.
Model.We used a 3 parameter model to estimate choice behavior. Gains and
losses were estimated with Eqs. 1 and 2 respectively, and Eq. 3 (a logit, or
softmax function) translated the difference between the subjective value
of the gamble and the subjective value of the guaranteed amount (esti-
mated using Eqs. 1 and 2) into a probability of gamble acceptance between
0 and 1. All 3 functions relied on the 3 parameters described below:  (the
loss aversion coefficient),  (the curvature of the utility function), and 
(the logit sensitivity).
ux	
 x [1]
ux
  x
 [2]
pgamble acceptance

 1  expugamble
-uguaranteed


1 [3]
 (Fig. S2a) only appears in the equation for the calculation of the utility of
losses (Eq. 2), since it refers to the multiplicative valuation of losses relative to
gains. When   1, gains and losses are valued equally (‘‘gain-loss neutral’’),
while  1 indicates the overvaluation of losses (loss averse), and  1means
gains are overvalued relative to losses (gain seeking).
 (Fig. S2b) represents risk aversion due to the presence of diminishing
sensitivity to changes in value as the absolute value increases, and  (Fig. S2c)
refers to the sensitivity of theparticipant’s choices to changes in thedifference
between subjective values of the gamble and the guaranteed amount (see SI
Text for more details on the model).
For all participants we separately estimated Attend and Regulate , , and
 values in Mathematica v5.2 using a maximum likelihood estimation proce-
dure. To determine overall model significance on a per subject, per condition
basis, we performed a likelihood ratio test against a randommodel to deter-
mine whether the probability of the data was significantly higher given the
parameters we estimated. To determine the significance of within-subject
changes in any given parameter, we performed a likelihood ratio test of the
full model (Attend and Regulate parameters) against a reduced model which
was allowed only one value of the parameter in question for both Attend and
Regulate. For more details on the estimation and tests, including against
alternative models, see SI Text.
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